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The EU’s Law-making Process in a Comparative Perspective 
 
Justin Greenwood (Robert Gordon University) and Christilla Roederer-
Rynning (University of Southern Denmark) 
 
As the directly elected institution of representative democracy, the 
European Parliament (EP) is at the centre of debates about the nature of 
the EU polity.1  The dramatic increase in its legislative powers since 
becoming a directly elected institution in 1979 makes it the central object 
of analysis about the development of the European Union.  At the core of 
its powers is its role as a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers for the 
overwhelming majority of legislative files since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, 
making the mechanics of co-decision a key unit of analysis.  The core 
question we address in this chapter 2is whether the EP, the people’s 
tribune in EU politics, has arrived at a stable set of arrangements in order 
to be able to assert itself in co-decision viz. other EU institutions.  
Trilogues present two potential risks for the EP as an organ of 
parliamentary representation: 1) depoliticizing conflict by delegating 
decision-making to technical experts; and 2) reducing the accountability 
and transparency of the decision-making process by making it more 
informal and ad hoc.  The key for the EP to counter these risks is to 
                                       
1 The authors acknowledge financial support from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC), grant ES/N018761/1 received as part of the Open 
Research Area (ORA) grant187/2015’.  Part of the material used in this chapter 
comes field research and interviews conducted by Christilla Roederer-Rynning in 
Washington DC from April to July 2017.   
2 In O Costa (forthcoming) (ed.) The European Parliament in Times of Crises: 
dynamics and transformations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
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develop a sense of common purpose as a parliamentary institution, and 
institutional autonomy to prevent being drawn into the Council’s world of 
diplomacy.  On these premises, we explore the extent to which the EP has 
been able to articulate procedures for internal conflict solving; and to 
what extent these rules have helped to ensure transparency of the 
legislative process and the accountability of elected representatives.  We 
examine these factors through an examination of the internal mechanisms 
of the EP in preparing for co-decision, trilogues, as a critical moment of 
the institutionalisation of the EP as a legislature.  We discuss these 
developments in a comparative perspective of EU and US institutions for 
bicameral conflict resolution.  
 
Trilogues and EU Decision Making 
The name Tri-logues denotes an informal but institutionalised mechanism 
for discussions between the three main EU decision making institutions, 
held in a secluded setting aimed at facilitating and securing legislative 
agreements.  Although co-decision defines up to three readings between 
the Council of Ministers and EP, trilogues offer the means to achieve early 
legislative agreements.  Their use has mushroomed since the 1999 
Amsterdam Treaty made it possible for co-decision to be concluded at any 
stage in the legislative process, resulting in a search for informal ways of 
coming to inter-institutional agreements at an earlier stage than might 
otherwise be the case. Thus, trilogues were borne of expediency, in 
recognition of the way the logistics of EU decision making would need to 
be fundamentally changed when nine countries joined the EU in 2004, as 
well as the growing role of the Parliament in co-decision assigned by the 
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Treaties (Shackleton and Raunio, 2003; Kreppel, 2003 and Héritier, 2012, 
in Broniecki, 2017).  The results have been startling.  The point when half 
of all legislative files were concluded at first reading was reached during 
the course of the 6th term of the EP (2004-2009) (Héritier and Reh, 2012), 
rising to 97% of legislative files being concluded at first or early second 
reading3 by the mid-way point of the 8th Parliamentary term (2014-2019) 
(European Parliament, 2017).  Thus, trilogues have become the modus 
operandi of EU decision making. 
 
Until 2007, trilogues went largely unregulated, typically involving 
secluded bargaining between a limited number of ‘relais actors’ (Farrell 
and Héritier, 2004), i.e. the EP Rapporteur, the Presidency and the 
respective institutional secretariats in a supporting role.  The 
consequences of these small closed huddles for democratic decision 
making have involved the progressive development of regulation aimed at 
the authorisation to enter negotiations, a mandate to negotiate with, 
pluralisation of actors, oversight of them, and reporting back.  The first 
regulation came in the form of an inter-institutional declaration on co-
decision in 2007, and from there in the development of in-house rules, 
most notably in the EP in 2012 and 2016, reviewed later.  The issue has 
long been the subject of contention in the EP, and was one of the factors 
informing the European Ombudsman to open her own initiative enquiry.  
                                       
3 Early second reading files typically reflect the inheritance of first reading 
positions adopted at the end of the preceding legislative term (European 
Parliament, 2017).Early second reading is where ‘the agreement between the 
Council and Parliament is reflected in the Council's Common Position rather than 
the Parliament's first reading report. This may be because a compromise was 
reached between the two only after Parliament had adopted its first reading 
report’ (House of Lords, n.d.)   
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The European Ombudsman pinpointed the democratic consequences of 
the trilogue process, drawing on both the EU’s representative and 
participatory strands of democracy: 
 
A representative democracy…implies that citizens are effectively 
empowered to hold their elected representatives accountable for 
the specific choices made by their representatives on their behalf. 
Second, citizens have “the right to participate in the democratic life 
of the Union.” (European Ombudsman, 2015b) 
 
If citizens are to scrutinise how their representatives performed, they 
need to be able to compare the outcome of the process with their 
representatives’ initial position, so that, if necessary, they can ask 
why positions changed and be reassured that the process took all 
interests and considerations into account.” (European Ombudsman, 
2015b) 
 
The Ombudsman stressed the way in which Articles 1 and 10(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union ensure that ‘decisions are taken as openly and 
as closely as possible to the citizen’, and recalled requirements for the 
Parliament and Council to meet in public when considering and voting on a 
draft legislative act as set out in Articles 15(2) and (3) in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.  Nonetheless, in an overture to the 
need for inter-institutional space to negotiate, including elected 
representatives as participants, the Ombudsman recommended the 




Today, a negotiated legislative file4 will typically involve between three 
to four trilogue summits (European Parliament, 2017; European 
Parliament, n.d.), but files with a high political content can involve 
considerably more.5  The topics for agreement become progressively more 
difficult as the trilogue meetings on a legislative file evolve.  In today’s 
practice, a trilogue will involve a relatively large number of participants 
from each of the three EU institutions, which at the upper reaches can 
extend to as many as 100 (European Parliament, 2017).6  Most attendees 
come from the Parliament, comprising the Committee Chair leading the 
delegation, sometimes replaced by a Vice-President (Ripoll Servent and 
Panning, 2017), the Rapporteur and Shadow Rapporteurs from the 
different parties, their assistants, political party functionaries, and a 
member of the Committee secretariat.  From the Commission, Heads of 
Unit or Directors attend, supported by the Legal Service and the Co-
Decision Unit, although sometimes Director-Generals or their Deputies 
attend from the outset, and often concluded by the appearance of a 
Commissioner.  The Council is represented by the rotating Presidency, but 
the personnel varies, with different traditions in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) COREPER I and COREPER II.  In 
COREPER II it is usually the Working Party Chair, whereas in COREPER I 
the Chair themselves often leads the Council delegation in all trilogues.  
As legislative files are long, negotiations can be exhaustive, some 
                                       
4 Around one-third are not negotiated 
5 In EP8, the largest in the first half term involved 14, for the General Data 
Protection Regulation 
6 The European Fund for Strategic Investments (European Parliament, 2017). 
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involving all-night sessions.  The negotiators work on a four column 
document, with the positions of each of the institutions identified 
respectively in the first three columns, and a blank fourth column waiting 
to be completed to reflect the inter-institutional agreement reached in the 




Figure 1: A full trilogue meeting 
 
A number of ‘technical’ preparatory meetings precede full ‘political’ 
trilogues as a means of coping with the legislative detail which typically 
accompanies regulatory policy making, as well as making logistical 
arrangements for trilogues, with different compositions of actors attending 
the different types of meetings.  In the main, attendees of technical 
preparatory meetings come from the secretariat of the respective 
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institutions, rather than the political level.  At the more logistical level of 
content, there are also bilateral meetings between the secretariat of the 
EP and Council (Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2017). Heads of Unit of the 
EP Committee Secretariat can be influential players throughout the layers 
of meetings (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017).  The layers 
beneath political trilogues contribute to the potential for the 
depoliticisation of inter-institutional decision making.   
 
Trilogues and Democratic Norms  
Whilst expedient, the informal and secluded nature of decision making 
which trilogues entail may place them at odds with standard norms of 
democratic practice.  ‘Trilogues are where deals are done’, located 
somewhere in between ‘the (institutional) space to negotiate’ and norms 
of transparency (European Ombudsman, 2015a).  Institutions like these 
are a means of expediting business, but their secluded nature and lack of 
record has made them targets for public anxiety (EU Observer, 2014; 
International New York Times, 2014).   
 
From a scholarly perspective, it has been noted that, whilst expeditious 
in facilitating early agreements between EU decision makers, trilogues 
have been an opaque and unaccountable form of decision-making (Farrell 
and Héritier 2004; Héritier and Reh 2012; Rasmussen and Reh 2013; Reh 
2014).  This literature highlights a series of issues, which boil down to the 
following potential problems.  First, there is a risk that trilogues privatise, 
or personalize, the decision-making process by removing it from the 
public gaze.  It is important to note that this risk is not inherent in closed 
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decision-making processes, but perhaps is compounded by it.  
Privatization is bad for both democracy and for stability since it 
personalises decisions, making them both potentially erratic and arbitrary. 
Second, there is a risk that trilogues depoliticise the decision-making 
process by delegating undue decisional power to technical experts.  
  
Our point here is that these risks have not quite similar consequences 
for the two branches of the legislative authority.  The co-legislators 
undoubtedly both have an interest in creating a secure space for ‘open 
and frank’ negotiations.  Furthermore, as co-legislating institutions, 
neither has an interest in privatising the decision-making process, which 
negates the very idea of an orderly process.  This being said, the EP is 
more vulnerable to this risk than the Council.  Given that the EP 
represents the EU citizenry, privatisation jeopardizes both the internal 
legitimacy and order of decision-making in the EP (as in the Council) and 
its external legitimacy (to the people) and arguably its very raison d’être 
in the institutional order of the EU.  The Council, which is technically not 
an organ of popular representation (but governmental representation), is 
less directly affected by accusations of democratic deficit.  Likewise, 
regarding the de-politicisation of the decision-making, the EP is arguably 
more affected by this risk than the Council, since articulating and 
aggregating political preferences through political compromises is 
arguably a test of its parliamentary pedigree.  The Council, working in a 
quasi-diplomatic style, has been historically comfortable delegating 
decision-making to technical experts in working parties and COREPER, 
even though the share of decisions made by ministers has recently risen 
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(House of Commons, 2017).  Based on these premises, we examine the 
response of the EP to the growing criticism of trilogues in the next section.   
 
Trilogues and the European Parliament  
When the Ombudsman opened her own-initiative enquiry in 2015 into the 
transparency of trilogues, the institutions collectively sought to place on 
record their concern that she was exceeding her powers, but nonetheless 
responded.  The responses demonstrate a deep commitment to current 
trilogue practice.  Council’s response identified specific concerns about 
how disclosure of trilogue documents ‘may seriously undermine the 
ongoing decision making process’ (EDRi, 2015, p.7).  On a less defensive 
but nonetheless devoted tone, the EP8 half-term Activity Report commits 
to further reflection on how trilogues can 
 
‘adequately deliver on citizens’ legitimate information needs, without 
undermining the fruitful working environment and conditions that 
have enabled Parliament, the Council and the Commission to 
respectfully and responsibly legislate over the years’ (European 
Parliament 2017, p.37) 
 
President Schulz sounded a similar line to the Council in warning the 
Ombudsman that 
 
‘undue formalisation of the trilogue process could lead to 
negotiations taking place outside the established process (without, 
for example, all political groups being present or the orderly 
10 
 
exchange of text proposals) and could therefore lead to less 
transparency rather than more’ (European Parliament 2017, p.25). 
 
However, while advocating the trilogue system, the EP has also tried to 
grapple actively with the issues raised in the public and internal debate, 
showing its higher sensitivity and vulnerability to criticisms of democratic 
deficit.  These efforts were not purely reactive.  In fact, a process of 
reform had started well before the Ombudsman’s own report.   Over the 
last decade, the EP has developed the most extensive internal rules of 
procedure of the three institutions, notably in 2009 (Annex XX, Code of 
Conduct for negotiating in the context of the ordinary legislative 
procedure), and in 2012 (Rules 73 and 74, abolished and replaced with 
Rules 69c, d and f) in 2016/2017.  These are comprehensive 
arrangements for pluralisation of actors in the trilogue process, 
authorisation, oversight and reporting back; the provision of a mandate; 
some degree of transparency of the process; and a limited degree of 
ability to amend trilogue agreements.  In 2009, at the end of EP6, the 
‘Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of Codecision Procedures’ 
was introduced as an Annex to the Rules of Procedure (Héritier and Reh 
2012), carrying, inter alia, a proviso that all political groups shall be 
represented, that the negotiating mandate be provided by the committee 
or plenary, that the negotiating team reports back after each trilogue on 
the outcomes of the negotiations and refreshes its mandate when 
negotiations changed the committee position, and that all texts be made 
available to the committee.  The 2012 revisions made Annex XX binding, 
and introduced the requirement for the committee chair or nominated 
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Vice-Chair to lead the EP official delegation (and chair of the trilogue when 
held on EP premises), collectively referred to as part of the ‘team’.  Rule 
73 comprised a comprehensive set of arrangements parallel to the 
provisions of the Code of Conduct, covering the composition of the 
negotiating team, the decision to open negotiations, the mandate on 
which to negotiate (for later consideration in plenary), a vote to approve 
the result of negotiations, and a report back after each Trilogue. The MEP 
political co-ordinators oversee the work of committee members in 
trilogue, assisted by advisors from the political parties.  Together, these 
arrangements have progressively met a number of the core criticisms 
aimed at the EP’s involvement in trilogues. 
 
The most recent revisions to EP procedures for handling trilogues were 
agreed in December 2016 to extend the powers of the plenary relative to 
committees to authorise the commencement of inter-institutional 
negotiations.  Thus, Rule 69c2 gives MEPs or political groups a brief time 
window to seek a plenary vote on a Committee’s decision to enter into 
negotiations with the Council. A further innovation of the rules changes 
was to introduce the publication of documents reflecting the outcome of 
the concluding trilogue.  A little noticed new rule introduction, Rule 59.3 
gives plenary the opportunity to decide not to have a single vote on the 
provisional agreement, but to vote on amendments.  This latter change 
addresses a long-standing criticism made by transparency NGOs of the 
EP’s position being weakened by its continued de facto constraint in being 
unable to unpick agreements concluded in inter-institutional trilogue 
negotiations, and presented as a fait accompli.  The extent of use of Rule 
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59.3 will help to address whether this criticism remains valid.  A coalition 
of 18 NGOs spelt out the dangers of policy-making in a secluded setting, 
in a 2015 letter to the President of the Parliament and Commission, and 
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, stressing how the secluded 
nature of trilogues privileges those with the resources and connections to 
be able to acquire information (Access Info Europe, 2015; European 
Digital Rights Initiative, 2015; Transparency International, 2015). 
 
In its best interpretation, changes to the rules mean that the EP’s 
participation in trilogues satisfy core democratic criteria.  That is: the 
mandate to negotiate with the Council is public, and endorsed by plenary; 
all of the political groups are represented in the trilogues; the negotiating 
team from the European Parliament have the responsibility to stay within 
the mandate given by the Committee, and to then see that a majority in 
the Committee supports the provisional agreement; that the Chair and 
Rapporteur report back to Committee; that the provisional agreement is 
voted on by the committee (in a single vote); and that plenary can now 
decide to vote on amendments to the provisional agreement.  Principles, 
however, need to be institutionalized in order to give democracy a 
substantive reality.    
 
Institutionalization of trilogues: Contrasting paths in the EP and 
the Council  
In the EP, the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) has led the process 
of institutional scrutiny and revision of the Trilogue process as they are in 
charge of the Rules of Procedure, with support for operational scrutiny 
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provided by two horizontal units, the Conciliations and Co-decision unit 
(CODE) and the Co-ordination of Legislation Unit, CORDLEG.  The 
development of procedures in AFCO have been assisted by key committee 
chairs in different parliamentary terms, as well as from the leadership of 
the political groups.  The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee 
(ECON) was at the centre of co-decision in EP7, accounting for over one-
fifth of all early legislative agreements in that term.  Its Chair in EP6, 
Pervenche Berès, was a norm leader in driving for Committee Chairs to be 
a regular member of the EP trilogue delegation, a practice diffused 
through the Conference of Committee Chairs, and continued via her 
position as chair of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee in EP7.  
Her successor as Chair of ECON, Sharon Bowles, also took up the cause, 
dynamically placing herself at the centre of each trilogue negotiation with 
the Council as a means of oversight and enforcement of committee 
positions. At the other extreme in EP7 was the Chair of the Committee on 
Transport and Tourism (TRAN), who spared his appearances on the 
grounds of the psychology of negotiations, intending to give a signal of 
gravitas by his attendance at the final meetings (Roederer-Rynning and 
Greenwood, 2015).   To a certain extent these approaches will vary 
between parliamentary terms as Committee chairs change, but the 
changes introduced have also become institutionalised (Roederer-Rynning 
and Greenwood, 2017).  The permanent secretariat of committees, 
project teams for different legislative files, the EP Legal Service, and 
horizontal coordination units which service co-decision committees, have 
played a part in this process.  Both of these have experienced substantial 
growth during the seventh term of the EP, as part of a wider process of 
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upgrading the capacity of the secretariat which also extends to the 
European Parliament Research Service (EPRS) (European Parliament, 
2014a).  And the number of assistants which Members can have has been 
increased to four.   Few national parliaments, with the exception of US 
Congress, enjoy access to knowledge and expertise on the scale displayed 
by the EP (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017). Thus, rules of 
pluralisation, delegation, and oversight have been institutionalized in the 
EP, ensuring that trilogues today are an essentially multilateralised 
exercise in the EP.  This means that trilogues in the EP have come a long 
way from the private deals occasionally stigmatised in the national and 
global media titles.     
  
While the institutionalization of trilogues in the EP means that internal 
accountability has been improved in the EP, the technical character of 
much EU legislation means that public scrutiny of co-decision files remains 
effectively performed by elite stakeholders and guardians of the public 
interest.  Specialised EU press outlets, such as Politico, EurActiv and 
EUObserver, join with national and global titles, to contribute to such 
monitoring.  Another part of the EU ecosystem of monitoring involves a 
teeming population of interest groups, with an extensive system of 
funding supporting the presence of EU NGOs, taking their place alongside 
producer organisations.  The main NGOs active in the field of transparency 
advocacy are Transparency International (EU liaison office), and smaller 
EU specific NGOs including Access Info Europe, and the European Digital 
Rights Initiative (EDRi). The UK based NGO Statewatch has also 




These NGOs point to an enduring challenge for the democratization of 
trilogues: the institutionalization of transparency rules.  The 2016 
Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on Better Regulation promised no more 
than a joint legislative database and ‘appropriate handling’ of trilogue 
negotiations in the context of the transparency of the legislative process 
(EDRi, 2015).  In more general terms, the IIA promised better 
communication to the public, and ‘to facilitate traceability of the various 
steps in the legislative process’ (EDRi, p.6), as a means of guarding 
against the possibility of corruption and potential negative externalities 
arising from lobbying.  These promises have yet to be implemented.  Until 
they are, the lack of traceability tools ensures that the public scrutiny of 
trilogues will continue to be difficult to perform in the foreseeable future.   
 
Whilst trilogues have been well institutionalised in the EP through rules 
of procedure, established practice is the main driver of the behaviour of 
the Council in trilogue negotiations (European Economic and Social 
Committee, 2017).  Working procedures are passed over from one 
Presidency to the next by training provided by the Council Secretariat, 
supplemented by various written guides.  A first agreement on a ‘General 
Approach’ is made either at Council or COREPER level (in the latter case 
sometimes called a ‘mandate’).  There are significant differences within 
the Council as to the need for further transparency in trilogues, with a 
predictable cleavage between the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and 
Slovenia on the one hand, and other countries who raise the traditional 
objection that further transparency would simply result in more rigid 
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positions and a less flexible approach.  Throughout the Council, 
nonetheless, there is support for a ‘diplomatic tradition’ (EESC, p.76) of 
flexibility. 
 
These points mean that a key difficulty for the Council viz. the EP is the 
ability of the latter to influence the negotiations by going public, whereas 
the Council’s position may only be known at a late stage, and then in the 
form of a General Approach (Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning 2015).  
The EP’s mandate, by contrast, is public from an early stage, whereas the 
diplomatic culture within the Council of internal deliberative 
confidentiality, and the less public position of the Council on legislative 
files, makes it vulnerable to the EP’s dexterity in political communication.   
 
The EU Process in Light of the US Experience 
Interestingly, the politics of private deals within and between chambers 
has been at the core of recent political controversies in US politics, too.  
These controversies have crystallized with the repeated, and at the time 
of writing infructuous, efforts by President Trump and his Republican 
majority in the US Congress to pass flagship legislation on health care 
reform and tax reform.  In the Senate, an institution designed for taking 
care of minorities and ‘provid[ing] extraordinary leverage to individual 
Senators’ (Heitshusen 2014, 2), the top Republican Mitch McConnell first 
kept the legislative process insulated in a small group of lawmakers (New 
York Times 8 May 2017)7 and, when he failed to garner the required 





number of votes, prepared to use an arcane budgetary procedure 
(Reconciliation Procedure) to force a repeal bill of Obama’s Affordable 
Health Care Act through Congress.  Meanwhile, on the equally pivotal tax 
reform file, the Republicans were hoping to push through legislation from 
a core group of six officials from the House, Senate and the White 
House—the so-called ‘Bix Six’ (The Wall Street Journal 8-9 July 2017).  
Seasoned observers of the Congress and lawmakers alike have voiced 
their concerns against what they see as the de-facto transformation of the 
Senate into a majoritarian institution and an opaque process taking place 
outside the formal institutional arenas of deliberation and lawmaking and 
concentrating power in the hands of a few congressional lawmakers.  
 
These developments are interesting because the US Congress and 
congressional politics have been a prime point of reference in the 
comparative literature on the EP (e.g., Kreppel 2002; Crombez and Hix 
2015).  Comparativists have long highlighted similarities between the US 
and European polities (see e.g., Sbragia 1992 and more recently Egan 
2015).  Both polities display a fragmented, multi-level political system, 
where the executive, legislative, and judiciary power are separated rather 
than fused, as in many European political systems.  Within this 
overarching construction, the US Congress and the EU’s legislative 
authority provide examples of some of the world’s most powerful 
legislative assemblies.  Article 1 of the US Constitution stipulates that ‘all 
legislative Powers herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives’.  
Though the EP cannot take such pride of place in the Maastricht Treaty 
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establishing the European Union or even in the Lisbon Treaty (which, 
while elevating the EP to the status of co-legislator, still keeps a number 
of areas outside of legislative purview), it is widely recognized as a 
powerful, federal-like legislature, bringing a powerful system of 
specialized, standing committees and its impressive analytical capabilities 
to bear on EU legislation.   Not only are both the US Congress and the EP 
influential actors in domestic politics; they have also established 
themselves as leading international diplomatic actors (Jancic 2015).  
Furthermore, with regards to the law-making process, both systems are 
characterized by the need for inter-chamber cooperation since passage of 
legislative act can only happen if the two chambers agree on the same 
legislative text.  In the US, as in the EU, this constitutional requirement 
brings the heterogeneity of the two chambers.  The US ‘Congress’ is in 
reality composed of two chambers with very different traditions, rules, 
political outlook, operating mode, and self-understanding.  Moreover, 
‘each chamber is jealous of its powers and prerogatives and generally 
suspicious of the other body’ (Olezsek 1974, 75).  It has been said that 
the ‘natural disinclination of the two bodies to work in tandem has limited 
joints committees to such housekeeping issues as government printing 
and overseeing the Library of Congress’ (Ritchie 2016, 48).  Likewise, the 
relationships between the two arms of the EU’s ‘legislative authority’—
epitomized in the pivotal legislative trilogues—can aptly be described as 
one of ‘comity and conflict’, to use a phrase applied to Congress (Olezsek 
1974).  Bearing these similarities in mind, it is interesting to understand 
the background against which the recent US controversies take place, and 
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discuss what kind of insights can be learned from these developments in 
the context of the EU’s own trilogue system.   
 
Several points are worth noting.  First, it is widely recognized that the 
contemporary US legislative process is rather unpredictable.  As a 
Congressional expert puts it, ‘the process by which a bill can become law 
is rarely predictable and can vary significantly from bill to bill.  In fact, for 
many bills, the process will not follow the sequence of congressional 
stages that are often understood to make up the legislative process’ 
(Heitshusen 2014, 1).  The life of bills is erratic.  ‘Many will never be 
brought up on the floor’ while ‘it is also possible, although less common, 
for a bill to come directly to the floor without being reported’ (Heitshusen 
2014, 7).  For Congressmen, this unpredictability can be a source of 
problem, as Members do not always understand the process very well 
(interview 1, Congressional Research Service, 4 April 2017).  Second, a 
great number of bills are passed without the need for bicameral 
negotiations because both chambers agree on the text.  Such consensual 
bills reportedly amount to 70% of all the legislative activity in Congress 
today.  There can be a variety of reasons for bicameral consensus.  Some 
bills may address rather trivial considerations, and thus generate little 
interest or conflict.  Additionally, bills often materialize in a coordinated 
way.  The two chambers are ‘not throwing bills at each other; they are 
coordinating in advance.  They try to iron things out in advance by 
Members and staff of both chambers talking with one another’ (interview 
2, Congressional Research Service, 23 June 2017).  Finally, third, where 
there is a need for inter-chamber negotiation (because of bicameral 
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disagreement on a bill), the two chambers now tend to settle their 
differences through other ways than the formal conference committee, 
designed for this purpose (Olezsek et al. 2016).  Over the last two 
decades, the number of reports adopted in conference committees has 
decreased from 53 under the 104th Congress (1994-1995) to 7 in the 
114th Congress (2014-2015) (Bipartisan Policy Center 2017).  Over the 
same period of time, the number of bills reported by committee in both 
chambers rose from 978 to 1271 (Bipartisan Policy Center 2017).  A more 
informal method of ‘exchange of amendments’ between the chambers, 
known as the ‘ping pong’ procedure, has become the favourite mode of 
reconciling differences (Olezsek 2008; Karadasheva 2012).  While this 
informal method was limited to technical bills, or bills to be adopted under 
time pressure, the ping pong procedure is now used in a broad range of 
situations.  As one observer puts it, the conference committee has 
become the ‘dodo bird’; the big driver of this trend has been the 
polarization of US politics, both outside of Congress and inside the 
chambers (interview 3, Congressional Research Service, 11 July 2017). 
Observers agree that it picked up pace in the mid-1990s, it has affected 
both chambers of Congress, and thereby also the legislative process 
including the politics of bicameral conflict resolution.  The link between 
polarization and the growing development of informal legislative practices 
appears to be pivotal in the US.  In both chambers, polarization means 
that the formal arenas for compromise-making have become gridlocked.  
This applies to the standing committees: as one observer puts it, ‘the 
tradition of the committee as a safe place for negotiation has dwindled 
toward extinction since the 1990s’ (Ronald Brownstein, National Journal, 
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11 May 2013).  This applies equally to conference committees, which have 
been known to generate their own informal and secretive deal-making 
outside the formal conference venue.  Over time, the very act of 
convening a conference committee to negotiate compromises between the 
two chambers has become very difficult because it requires overcoming 
several challenging procedural hurdles in the Senate, which minorities 
have blocked.  The development of ping pong legislation is not the only 
indicator of the growing informality of the US legislative process.  As 
mentioned in the beginning of this section, it is now not exceptional to see 
important legislation develop across the chambers in ad hoc, insulated 
groups of congressmen.  This style of legislative politics is not limited to 
Congress under the Trump Presidency; Obama himself resorted to it to 
develop important legislative proposals on immigration and other topics.  
Informal alliances are now increasingly used to stave off the destructive 
effects of polarization.   
 
These developments bring into relief the growing importance of 
informal politics in both the EU and the US polities over the last two 
decades.  In both polities, informal politics has developed to bridge the 
tensions between fragmentation and integration in these federal 
legislatures, and eventually deliver policy.  The comparison between the 
EU and the US polities also serves to highlight important differences in the 
nature of informal politics and the interaction between legislative 
institutions and their political context.  Regarding informal politics itself, 
the EU and the US polities actually seem to illustrate diverging trends of 
institutionalization (EU) and de-institutionalization (US) of the legislative 
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process.  While we can now consider trilogues as an informal institution, 
with a set of predictable rules and routines guaranteeing EP committees 
and political minorities in the EP a ‘formal’ role in the informal 
negotiations, there seems to be—as highlighted above—precious little 
predictability today in the US legislative process.  While the ping pong 
process represents the most institutionalized part of US informal 
legislative politics, the ‘gangmen style’ of legislative politics as Brownstein 
puts it (National Journal, 11 May 2013) can arguably best be understood 
as a step towards de-institutionalization: we are in the realm of informal 
alliances rather than informal institutions.  This is an inhospitable realm 
for democracy.   
 
In all likelihood, bicameral compromises in the EU and in the US will 
continue to involve negotiations in insulated forum.  It is key to realize 
that insulation need not be bad for democracy: there are in fact good 
reasons to believe that insulated arenas can promote persuasion—or the 
ability to convince others on the basis on reasoned arguments (Checkel 
2005), whereas open arenas may promote little more than ideological 
messaging or ‘strategic disagreement’, when ‘party to a potential deal 
“avoid the best agreement that can be gotten given the circumstances in 
order to seek political gain”’ (Gilmour, cited in Binder and Lee 2016, 96).  
Even though the institutionalization of EU trilogues is a positive 
development for democracy, we would like to sound several cautionary 
notes.  First, the institutionalization of trilogues is uneven across the co-
legislators.  Second, it is reversible in the EP where it still lacks formal 
means of enforcement.  Third, the EU legislators operate now in a political 
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environment characterized by an increasing polarization of European 
publics regarding European integration.  Not only is the trilogue system, 
with all its flaws and weaknesses, an easy target for Euroskeptical 
narratives based on idealized versions of democracy.  This European form 
of radical polarization may put EU institutions of bicameral conflict 
resolution under the same strain as the US.  For in the end, while 
ideological pluralism is the hallmark of democracy, democracy is 




Trilogues have become the modus operandi of EU decision making.  The 
EP being a directly elected institution, trilogues carry more risk for the 
legitimacy of the EP than for Council.  Over time, the EP has developed a 
series of rules to tackle the range of issues around removing decision 
making from the public gaze, whilst at the same time defending the need 
for an institutional space to negotiate with the Council of Ministers in 
camera.  In the most recent revision of rules, there is a mechanism for 
the political groups to bring a plenary vote on a Committee’s decision to 
enter into negotiations with the Council on the basis of a particular 
mandate, meaning that the EP’s position is both public and carries the 
endorsement of elected representatives from across the political 
spectrum.  All of the political groups are represented in trilogues, and the 
Committee oversees changes to the mandate.  At the end of the process 
there is an opportunity for plenary to vote on amendments, rather than 
simply the entire package negotiated with the Council of Ministers.  The 
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EP has developed a system which is much more formalised than the 
Council, where trilogues have been absorbed into existing custom and 
practice of diplomatic tradition.  Whilst NGOs provide a reminder that 
there is still work to be done in terms of the transparency of the process, 
in the EP, trilogues have come a long way from the early day caricature of 
private deal making.  This gradual process of institutionalising informal 
politics stands in stark contrast to the United States, where the story is 
more one of de-institutionalisation, in which bicameral conflict resolution 
has been driven underground as a result of the polarisation of politics.  
Ultimately, the EU’s informal institutions have greater democratic 
insulation than the informal alliances of US politics.   
 
The seclusion of arenas in both polities provide for unpredictability, 
though even this has been eroded in the EU system by the investiture of 
new rights in the full European Parliament to unpick negotiated deals with 
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